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A mong the main criticisms currently confronting the US Patent and Trade-mark Offi ce are concerns about software patents and what role they play in the web of litigation now proceeding in the smart phone industry. While 
such criticisms are not new, the realm of smart phones offers an opportunity to 
examine the evidence on the litigation and the treatment by the Patent Offi ce of 
patents that include software elements. The term “software patent” is a bit of a 
misnomer, since computer programming is a general purpose technology. After all, 
patents that claim software elements can be found in virtually every industry and a 
broad range of technologies.
More broadly, this article discusses the competing values at work in the patent 
system and how the system has dealt with disputes that, like the smart phone wars, 
routinely erupt over time, in fact dating back to the very founding of the United States. 
We present specifi c empirical evidence regarding the examination by the Patent Offi ce 
of software patents, their validity, and their role in the smart phone wars. The article 
concludes with an outlook for systematic policymaking within the patent system in 
the wake of major recent legislative and administrative reforms. Principally, the article 
highlights how the US Patent Offi ce acts responsibly when it engages constructively 
with principled criticisms and calls for reform, as it has during the passage and now 
implementation of the landmark Leahy–Smith America Invents Act of 2011.
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 Constitutional Background
For more than 235 years, a national investment in the future has been part of 
the formal social contract of the United States, providing patent rights limited in 
time and scope in exchange for a full and timely disclosure of new and useful inno-
vations. The US Constitution in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 expressly empowers 
Congress to manage this investment by establishing a patent system. The consti-
tutional design of the US patent system recognizes that the marketplace tends to 
undersupply knowledge, particularly when up-front costs of discovery or develop-
ment are high and marginal costs of copying are low. A period of limited exclusivity 
is meant to provide an incentive to make such investments.
Accordingly, the revealed national preference of the United States has been 
to forgo some immediate economic benefi t in favor of creating incentives for new 
generations of advances in scientifi c knowledge and technological application. 
There is a natural tendency for innovation—which requires investment for long-
term benefi t—to interfere with access in the form of consumption in the short term. 
But even in the here and now, this constitutionally protected ability of innovators 
in the United States to leverage their patent rights for attracting investment capital, 
creating jobs, and expanding into new markets refl ects a preference for ensuring 
that individuals and small start-up fi rms have an opportunity to thrive and grow. To 
be sure, patent rights are only part of a suite of legal and nonlegal appropriability 
options available to innovators. Still, patents have been a useful and oft-used means 
of protecting innovations since the country’s inception.
The Patent Offi ce Role
The US Patent and Trademark Offi ce’s primary responsibility is to support the 
innovation system by examining patent and trademark applications. In the US system, 
patents on mechanical, electronic, and chemical technologies are generally “utility 
patents.” Utility patent applications submitted to the Patent Offi ce by inventors may 
cover processes, machines, articles of manufacture, or compositions of matter. Upon 
being accepted as complete, applications are given a technology classifi cation and 
assigned to an examiner group. Patent examiners are specialized technology employees 
with training and experience in various science and engineering backgrounds related 
to different kinds of inventions. Examiners are also public offi cers who have a legal 
duty to grant a patent so long as the inventor has met the requirements for patent-
ability set by Congress and the federal courts. In fact, Congress demands that “[a] 
person shall be entitled to a patent unless” the examiner is able to fi nd a basis to 
refuse the application. To fi nd possible bases for rejection, the examiner compares 
the claimed invention to the existing state of knowledge as refl ected in the prior art, 
consisting of patent documents and the scientifi c and commercial literature.
Because a patent is a series of claims that defi ne the scope of the invention, 
an examiner uses the results of that search to determine whether these claims 
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delineate what the law demands: that the invention be new, useful, and adequately 
described and enabled. A legally suffi cient claim must also be nonobvious to 
persons “having ordinary skill in the art” of the invention, so as to encourage 
inventions that will serve the cumulative advancement of technology at the fron-
tiers of knowledge.
Through such search and examination of the application, examiners serve the 
public by clearing out patent claims that do not meet these legal requirements. 
Their labor is highly complex and knowledge-intensive, since it requires both 
scientifi c and legal understanding. In 2011, the Patent Offi ce received over 500,000 
applications.
The most fundamental and important contribution the Patent Offi ce makes to 
improving the patent system involves focusing on, and investing in, higher-quality 
and more timely processing of patent applications (US Patent and Trademark Offi ce 
2010). In this context, “quality” refers to patent claims being clearly defi ned and 
consistently interpreted under the law, and “timeliness” encompasses a reduction 
in delays and pendency during examination. Both goals reduce uncertainty, and 
allow for more effi cient investment and transactions in the market for innovation. 
Scholars have consistently supported these goals to improve the operation of the 
innovation system (National Research Council 2004).
Economic Research
This focus on reducing uncertainty—an economic concept—raises an impor-
tant question about what role the patent system plays in economic growth. It is clear 
that a substantial share of national growth in the United States has been driven by 
innovation and the deployment of new technologies, which have, in turn, produced 
higher standards of living along with better, longer lives for people. Economists 
have struggled over the years to discover what role intellectual property rights play 
in the supply of innovation and the productivity improvements and economic 
growth that new technologies have ushered in. The task has been made diffi cult by 
endogeneity problems, in that patenting is correlated with other important drivers 
of performance. Good instruments to help us untangle this complexity are rare to 
nonexistent, and apart from some fi ne historical examples (Moser 2005), increasing 
international harmonization of patent laws minimizes the opportunity to observe 
the results of natural experiments in the real world.
That said, a body of economic research has demonstrated a positive role for 
patenting in economic performance. Gould and Gruben (1996), for instance, 
utilize cross-country data on patent protection to fi nd that intellectual property 
protection is a signifi cant determinant of economic growth. Branstetter and Saggi 
(2011) contribute to this general fi nding, showing that increased intellectual 
property protection in developing countries leads to more inbound foreign direct 
investment, a greater local production share of the global basket of goods, and 
higher real wages for local labor.
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The mechanisms through which patent rights work to drive growth have also 
been a subject of research. In addition to the classical view that intellectual property 
rights provide an incentive to create knowledge (Arrow 1962), scholars have found 
that the issuing of patents is a signifi cant determinant of commercializing inven-
tions through licensing (Gans, Hsu, and Stern 2008). This latter view is consistent 
with work on the role of intellectual property rights in providing a transactional 
platform that facilitates a more effi cient transfer of knowledge assets and gains from 
trade in the markets for technology (Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella 2004).
At the level of the fi rm, too, patents have been found to have an economi-
cally and statistically signifi cant impact on fi rm-level productivity and market value 
(Bloom and Van Reenen 2002). Evidence provided by several surveys of managers at 
technology fi rms supports the notion that patents are valuable and serve a range of 
purposes, in preventing copying, earning profi ts, and engaging in effective technology 
competition. In a survey of research and development managers at fi rms across the 
US economy, researchers discovered that patents are widely used by fi rms in industry 
and are routinely cited as being important for profi ting from innovation, although not 
ubiquitously so (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 2000). The respondents suggested that 
when patents were used, they served heterogeneous purposes, including protecting 
inventions from copying, earning licensing revenues, supporting negotiations, and 
enhancing reputation. A more recent survey of young technology startups basically 
confi rmed these fi ndings, although the respondents commonly cited the importance 
of building patent portfolios to facilitate inward capital investment and increasing the 
likelihood of successful exit events such as initial public offerings and acquisitions by 
other fi rms (Graham, Merges, Samuelson, and Sichelman 2009).
While a growing body of evidence fi nds that patent protection supports innova-
tion and growth, some critics contend that the patent system should be dismantled 
wholesale. However, large systematic changes of the kind advocated by these 
critics are best interpreted in light of Oliver Williamson’s (2009) “remediableness” 
criterion, to wit: an existing practice for which no superior feasible alternative can 
be described and implemented with expected net gain is presumed to be effi cient. 
Without strong evidence of the superiority of such a large change in the institu-
tional environment in which innovation and economic activity occurs, a “do away 
with patents” alternative cannot be fairly categorized as a hypothetical ideal. And 
even if, arguendo, such an alternative were hypothetically ideal, the large transaction 
costs associated with moving an innovation system and an economy to this new equi-
librium would have to be considered in netting out the possible gains. Advocates for 
this view have made little progress in carrying either of these very heavy burdens.
 The Patent System Has Faced and Still Faces Problems Arising from 
New Technologies and Uncertainty in Legal Treatment
The view that society would do better by rejecting patent incentives as both 
unnecessary and obstructing to knowledge consumption in the short term is closely 
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related to criticisms that have been made regarding the patent infringement 
litigation of recent years among fi rms in the smart phone industry. Such arguments 
suggest that these so-called “smart phone wars” arise from overbroad and improp-
erly issued software patents, and thus refl ect fl aws in patent eligibility doctrine, a 
too-permissive treatment at the Patent Offi ce of software patents, and economic 
waste in litigation. Such criticisms are not new. They commonly refl ect the recur-
ring diffi culty the patent system has experienced when facing the legal and market 
uncertainty associated with the eruption of discontinuous technological change.
History is a guide to us in this regard, since over time the United States patent 
system has been met with new challenges in technology and industrial organization, 
but has adapted. At times, the resolution has come legislatively, as in the 1836 patent 
act. Under the 1793 patent statute, patent examination was not just permissive, it 
was nonexistent: the Patent Offi ce granted any patent properly applied for, leaving 
to society and the courts the costs of clarifying patent rights through piecemeal 
litigation. To mitigate the social costs, the 1836 patent act reintroduced substantive 
examination of patent applications for novelty and utility.
In this century, important changes in the patent law intended to deal with the 
demands of a changing innovation environment have occurred in 1930,1 in 1952,2 
in 1970,3 in 1982,4 in 1994,5 in 1999,6 and again recently in the sweeping changes 
required in the 2011 America Invents Act (which we discuss below). Often the change 
has come about because of compelling factual circumstances, such as regional or 
national economic concerns or even the exigencies of war. Such changes have been 
messy and with contradiction, and often against the backdrop of patent litigation 
around the valuable technologies at stake. But a well-developed economic history 
suggests that this is what we should expect when institutional systems supporting 
economic activity respond to new circumstances (North 1981).
In the history of the United States, society has repeatedly celebrated seminal 
inventions while bemoaning the patent disputes that emerged around them. For 
example, Eli Whitney patented the mechanical cotton gin in 1794, ushering in huge 
productivity gains, but was unable to prevent wholesale infringement for many years 
since local juries, who resented Whitney for taking large royalties from farmers, 
1 Plant Patent Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-245, 46 Stat. 376 (making patent-eligible certain new varieties 
of plants).
2 Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (broadly codifying and clarifying existing patent 
case law).
3 Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (extending exclusive plant 
breeder rights to sexually reproduced and tuber-propagated varieties).
4 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 25. (creating the 
US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and giving it exclusive jurisdiction over appeals both from 
patent litigations in the district courts and from administrative patent appeals in the US Patent and 
Trademark Offi ce).
5 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (among other things, setting the 
patent term as 20 years from fi ling date rather than 17 years from issue date).
6 American Inventors Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (among other things, adjusting 
patent term to partly compensate for certain examination delays, and requiring publication of most 
applications at 18 months from fi ling date).
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would rule against him. It was not until the patent law was amended in 1800 that 
Whitney’s legal rights were vindicated, and even then with limited economic reward.
A half-century later, when Elias Howe in 1846 patented his eye-pointed needle 
sewing machine, contributing to productivity gains and new economic freedoms 
for women, it began a period of extensive litigation among industry rivals. In 
response to moves like those of Isaac Singer, who tried unsuccessfully to invalidate 
the Howe patent, the legal landscape changed again, with the emergence in 1856 
of one of the fi rst US patent pools, in which major producers cross-licensed their 
mutually blocking patents. Notably, Howe was not himself a manufacturer of sewing 
machines, but rather a patent-holder interested in licensing his invention—by 
modern standards, a nonpracticing entity.
Another half-century later, Orville and Wilbur Wright patented the wing and 
steering designs of their fl ying machine, in 1906, and showed their work to the Aerial 
Experiment Association, founded the following year by another celebrated inventor 
and well-known patent litigant, Alexander Graham Bell. Having refused a license 
from Glenn Curtiss for his engine, the Wrights were soon mired in litigation when 
airplanes built by Curtiss and other industry players that infringed on the Wright 
brothers’ steering patents met with commercial and reputational success. While the 
infringement dispute ended with a verdict for the Wrights, the broader business 
dispute was resolved only when Assistant Navy Secretary Franklin Roosevelt in 1917 
pressured the rivals to allow unrestricted production of airplanes for the war effort. 
The scale of the dispute was larger than ever, but the lessons of the sewing machine 
wars had not been lost, and the airplane patents were cross-licensed through a patent 
pool administered by Manufacturer’s Aircraft Association.
Still another half-century later, in 1957, Columbia University student Gordon 
Gould made some rough calculations and a sketch in his notebook of the fi rst 
LASER (that is, Light Amplifi cation by Stimulated Emission of Radiation). Gould 
soon left Columbia for a private research fi rm, and other scientists independently 
developed the same technology about three months after Gould, igniting a 30-year 
series of disputes. When Gould ultimately prevailed, the controversy over invention 
priority gave way to industry resistance during the 1970s and 1980s to the enforce-
ment of Gould’s patents that had been pending as applications for long periods of 
time. Such so-called “submarine” patents can be problematic in instances like lasers, 
where the patented technology becomes widely adopted across industries without 
fi rms knowing that fundamental patents exist. As before, the system righted itself, 
in this instance by reducing the ability of inventors to “submarine” their inventions, 
in 1995 by changing the measurement and length of the patent term, and in 1999 
by publishing patent applications 18 months after fi ling.
Now, again about 50 years later after the struggles over the laser, we are embroiled 
in the smart phone wars. When we take the long view, this controversy does not look 
like a dispute for the ages, but instead a kind of controversy that has arisen periodi-
cally throughout the history of the US innovation system. The resolution of each 
crisis has been a refi nement and reform of the patent law to meet modern needs, 
particularly as innovation has over time commanded increasing priority to national 
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economic health. That same recalibration appears to be at work in how the system is 
dealing with smart phone patents. In fact, fair examination of the available evidence 
shows that the smart phone patent wars are not about low-quality software patents, 
nor about errors in software patent examination or issuance.
Smart Phone Wars and “Software Patents:” Some Empirical Evidence
The smart phone patent wars have produced a large number of US lawsuits 
involving major industry players like Samsung, Google’s Motorola Mobility divi-
sion, and Apple, with many counterpart suits fi led overseas. Yet across these many 
lawsuits involving smart phones, some important questions have gone unanswered. 
How credible are the lawsuits? How far have these suits progressed, and how many 
patents are actually involved? And, given that many critics have suggested the 
culprit is low-quality software patents, what technologies were actually covered by 
the patents involved, and how did the patents fare?
In attempting to answer these questions, we examined the US patents involved 
in some of the high-profi le litigation among four major fi rms in the smart phone 
industry: Motorola, Microsoft, Apple, and Samsung. While 133 patents were initially 
asserted across 13 lawsuits, a substantial share was dismissed from the cases and, as 
of November 2012, only 73 patents remained in controversy. A technology expert at 
the Patent Offi ce reviewed these 73 patents, determining whether any of the claims 
could be fairly characterized as involving “software” inventions. We found that 65 
of the patents included at least one software-related claim. Thus, while many of 
the patents asserted in the Motorola, Microsoft, Apple, and Samsung suits involved 
software claims, not all of the claims were to software elements, and in fact some of 
the patents asserted had no software elements at all. This fi nding is not surprising, 
as smart phones contain much innovation beyond software—for example, display 
technology, microprocessor technology, signal processing technology, signal trans-
mission technology, and compression technology.
Of the 65 software patents still involved in this litigation, thus far only 21 of 
them—less than one-third—have received court decisions of the type that provide 
some indication of their validity or likely validity. Of those, only four patents have 
had decisions indicating they are invalid or likely invalid. The remaining 17 software 
patents evaluated so far in these cases have been declared by a court to be valid or 
likely valid. This 80 percent favorability ratio is not consistent with the pronounce-
ments that the smart phone wars are being driven by low-quality software patents. In 
fact, this rate of validity determinations compares favorably with other technology 
areas. In summary, the US federal district courts, which are the principal reviewers 
of Patent Offi ce decision-making, are fi nding in a large share of these cases that 
prior Patent Offi ce examinations of the software patents involved in the smart 
phone litigation have been completed properly.
While that fi nding is positive, we were interested in digging deeper and asking 
other relevant questions. The recent US Supreme Court case of Bilski v. Kappos 
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(130 S. Ct. 3218 [2010]), which overturned a lower-court ruling that patents needed 
to involve a machine (or apparatus) and/or a transformation of an article to a 
different state or thing, has implications for the patent-eligibility of software and is 
but the latest in a series of reminders that this area of law continues to evolve. The 
Patent Offi ce will continue to reassess its granting and legal treatments of patents 
that include software elements.
The patenting of software has created much controversy, and the underlying 
arguments go back long before courts in the 1980s and 1990s affi rmed patent-
eligibility for software and, relatedly, for patents for “business methods” (Graham 
and Mowery 2003). Since as early as the Morse telegraph patent disputes in the 
1840s, the US patent system has grappled with abstract ideas such as mathematical 
principles and laws of nature on the one hand, and implementations of these ideas 
on the other—particularly in nascent technologies where both scientifi c and legal 
uncertainty is high. In rejecting one part of Samuel Morse’s patent claim—the 
part concerning the use of electromagnetic power for marking characters at any 
distance—the US Supreme Court in O’Reilly v. Morse (56 US 62 [1853]) noted 
that Morse had described and enabled only the use of galvanic repeater circuits 
to preserve a signal over long distances. Without disclosing and teaching more, 
the Court found, his patent could not cover future applications of electromagnetic 
force: he could claim his way of transmitting signals, but not signal transmission itself.
This emphasis on knowledge diffusion and the patent quid pro quo, particu-
larly in emerging and legally uncertain technological environments, has remained 
integral in US patent law to rewarding particular innovative solutions to problems 
without foreclosing the problems themselves. Similarly, the patent law leaves avail-
able to the public the intellectual tools that follow-on innovators can use to solve 
such problems.
In the context of software inventions, these principles have been applied by the 
US Supreme Court. It has denied patent-eligibility to bare algorithms for converting 
binary-coded decimal numbers into pure binary numerals (Gottschalk v. Benson, 
409 US 63 [1972]) and for smoothing fl uctuations in process variable trends (Parker 
v. Flook, 437 US 584 [1978]), but affi rmed patent-eligibility for the physical imple-
mentation by a rubber-molding press of the Arrhenius equation (Diamond v. Diehr, 
450 US 175 [1981]). At the Patent Offi ce, the examining of patent applications for 
software-related inventions has emphasized, through exacting review of the written 
description and enabling disclosure of the application, that the invention as claimed 
must be commensurate with the invention as taught to the public.
Before examining data on patenting of software inventions, fi rst comes a defi -
nitional question: What is a software patent, and can we identify it? As any patent 
examiner can confi rm, applications across virtually all major technology areas can 
include software elements, and among economic researchers, no common defi ni-
tion has emerged for conducting empirical analysis (Layne-Farrar 2005). Part of the 
diffi culty stems from software having some of the characteristics of a general purpose 
technology. As outlined by Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995), these technologies 
are “pervasive,” being widely adopted across many technologies and heterogeneous 
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sectors in the economy. In fact, one way in which researchers measure “generality” 
in empirical analyses of patenting is to examine how widely adopted patents are in 
later, heterogeneous patented technologies (Hall and Trajtenberg 2004). Related to 
such pervasiveness, an accurate “software patent” defi nition is elusive because many 
patents have software elements mixed with non-software elements.
While the relatively small number of patents involved in the smart phone wars 
allowed us, above, to employ an expert to read the claims, that method is neither 
reproducible nor feasible for large-scale empirical analyses. We therefore relied on 
methods commonly used in the prior literature to identify “software patents,” by 
employing patent classifi cations (Graham and Mowery 2003; Hall and MacGarvie 
2010). Still, identifying patents with software elements can be a tricky business.
To conduct the following analyses in this paper, Patent Offi ce experts examined 
all US patent classes and subclasses and determined which were likely to contain 
patents applications or issued patents containing some element of either general 
purpose software or software that is specifi c to some form of hardware.7 While this 
defi nition will certainly be both over-inclusive and under-inclusive, the method is 
calibrated to help us identify classes in which patents with software claims are most 
likely to be found. As shorthand, we refer to those applications or patents which fall 
into these classes and subclasses as “software” applications or patents, and to those 
7 The class-subclass pairs are as follows. Class 29: Subclasses 026000-065000, 560000-566400, 650000-
650000; Class 73: Subclasses 455000-487000, 570000-669000; Class 84: Subclasses 600000-746000; Class 
235; Class 236; Class 244: Subclasses 003100-003300, 014000; Class 250; Class 257; Class 307; Class 315; 
Class 318: Subclasses 700000-832000; Class 320; Class 323; Class 324; Class 326; Class 327; Class 330; 
Class 331; Class 340: Subclasses 850000-870440; Class 340: Subclasses 002100-010600, 825000-825980; 
Class 340: Subclasses 286010-693900, 901000-999000; Class 340: Subclasses 815400-815730, 815740-
815920; Class 341: Subclasses 020000-035000, 173000-192000; Class 341: Subclasses 001000-017000, 
050000-172000, 200000-899000; Class 342: Subclasses 001000-465000; Class 343; Class 345: Subclasses 
001100-215000, 418000-428000, 440000-472300, 473000-475000, 501000-517000, 518000-689000, 
690000-698000, 699000; Class 348; Class 353; Class 355; Class 356: Subclasses 002000-003000, 004090-
004100, 006000-027000, 030000-139000, 140000, 142000-151000, 153000-900000; Class 358: Subclasses 
001100-003320, 260000-517000, 518000-540000; Class 359: Subclasses 326000-332000; Class 361: 
Subclasses 001000-270000, 437000; Class 363; Class 365; Class 367: Subclasses 001000-008000, 009000, 
010000-013000, 014000-080000, 081000-085000, 086000, 087000-092000, 093000-094000, 095000-
191000, 197000-199000, 900000-910000, 911000-912000; Class 368; Class 369: Subclasses 001000-032000, 
043000-054000, 058000-062000, 064000, 069000-070000, 083000-095000, 097000, 100000-126000, 
128000-152000, 174000-175000, 275100-276000, 300000; Class 370; Class 374; Class 375; Class 378: 
Subclasses 004000-020000, 210000-901000; Class 379: Subclasses 067100-088280, 188000-337000; Class 
380; Class 381; Class 382; Class 385; Class 386; Class 396: Subclasses 028000, 048000-304000, 310000-
321000, 373000-386000, 406000-410000, 421000, 449000-501000, 505000-510000, 529000-533000, 
563000; Class 398; Class 438: Subclasses 009000, 689000-698000, 704000-757000; Class 455; Class 463: 
Subclasses 001000-047000, 048000-069000; Class 473: Subclasses 065000, 070000, 136000, 140000-
141000, 151000-156000, 407000; Class 482: Subclasses 001000-009000, 051000-053000, 057000-065000, 
069000-070000, 112000-113000; Class 600: Subclasses 001000-015000, 019000-041000, 300000-406000, 
407000-480000, 481000-507000, 529000-595000, 920000-921000; Class 606: Subclasses 001000-052000, 
163000-164000; Class 623: Subclasses 024000-026000; Class 700; Class 701; Class 702; Class 703: Subclasses 
001000-010000, 011000-012000, 013000-999000; Class 704; Class 705; Class 706; Class 707; Class 708; Class 
709; Class 710; Class 711; Class 712; Class 713; Class 714: Subclasses 001000-100000, 699000-824000; Class 
715; Class 716; Class 717; Class 718; Class 719; Class 725; Class 726; Class 901; Class 902.
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which fall outside as “non-software,” with the understanding that this nomenclature 
is one of convenience, and will not be accurate in all cases.
Having a defi nition of convenience in hand, we can then proceed to some 
questions. How does our rejection rate for software applications compare with 
that of applications in the other technologies? Conversely, how does our rate of 
allowance on a fi rst-action by the examiner compare with that of applications 
in the other technologies? How often are our examiners’ rejection decisions 
upheld by our board of patent appeals (the principal reviewer within the Patent 
Offi ce of examiners’ denying patent protection)? How has our reviewing court, 
the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, treated our rejection decisions 
compared with our own board of patent appeals? In other words, when the board 
of patent appeals upholds examiner rejections, how does the US Court of Appeals 
treat those determinations?
First, as regards fi nal rejections, the Patent Offi ce used to reject software appli-
cations at a higher rate than non-software applications, as shown in Figure 1. Ten 
years ago, the rate of fi nal rejection for software applications was 38.4 percent, 
2.8 percentage points higher than for non-software applications. Over time, the 
fi nal rejection rates for both software and non-software applications had risen, 
exceeding 60 percent by 2009. Thereafter, these rates declined to below 55 percent. 
Figure 1
Share of US Patent Offi ce First Final Actions that Were Rejections, FY 2003–FY 2012
Source: Authors.
Notes: After an examiner initially rejects claims as unpatentable and the applicant responds with 
arguments or amendments, the examiner issues a “fi nal action:” either an allowance or rejection. This is 
termed a “fi rst fi nal action” because the applicant may seek continued examination, leading to further 























Stuart Graham and Saurabh Vishnubhakat     77
Among fi rst fi nal actions8 per year from fi scal years 2003 through 2012, rejections 
were more likely for software applications than for non-software applications by 
an average difference of just 1.4 percentage points. These annual differences were 
signifi cant at the 95 percent confi dence interval for every year observed except 
2006, 2007, and 2010. Cumulatively, rejections were more likely for software 
applications than for non-software applications by a difference of 2.4 percentage 
points, signifi cant at the 95 percent confi dence interval. The fi nal rejection rate 
for software applications in 2012 is 53.1 percent, only 0.7 percentage points higher 
than for non-software applications, again a difference signifi cant at the 95 percent 
confi dence interval. Over the last decade, it appears that there has been relatively 
little difference in the treatment of software and non-software patent application 
rejections in the Patent Offi ce.
As a comparison, we also examine the likelihood that a patent application 
will be allowed during the fi rst action on the merits by the examiner during fi scal 
years 2003 through 2012. As illustrated in Figure 2, while fi rst-action allowances 
were sometimes more, and sometimes less, likely for software patents than for non-
software patents, the annual differences were small, and signifi cant at the 95 percent 
8 After an examiner initially rejects claims as unpatentable and the applicant responds with arguments 
or amendments, the examiner issues a “fi nal action:” either an allowance or rejection. This is termed a 
“fi rst fi nal action” because the applicant may seek continued examination, leading to further iterations 
of nonfi nal and fi nal actions subsequent to the “fi rst” one.
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confi dence interval for 2006–2008 and 2010–2012. Cumulatively during the entire 
period, these fi rst-action allowances were less likely for software applications than 
for non-software applications by a difference of 0.5 percentage points, signifi cant at 
the 95 percent confi dence interval. Over the last decade, it again appears that there 
has been relatively little difference in the treatment of software and non-software 
patent application allowances in the Patent Offi ce.
Several different explanations could account for these trends, particularly 
the recent decline in fi nal rejection rates. One is that the Patent Offi ce’s focus on 
more compact and effective interaction between the applicant and the examiner 
has resulted in dispositions without the need for fi nal rejections. Another is that 
guidelines, best practices, and outreach to the applicant community regarding 
obviousness, written description, and other examination issues have resulted in 
higher-quality applications being fi led in the fi rst place, a selection effect that would 
result in fewer fi nal rejections.
But one explanation that the evidence does not support is that fewer fi nal rejec-
tions refl ect low-quality examination by the Patent Offi ce. In fact, data from Patent 
Offi ce internal quality assurance reviews on nearly 29,000 random examination 
audits over six years show that, for both software and non-software applications, 
the overwhelming majority of allowances and fi nal rejections correctly apply the 
patent laws and examination standards. Allowances across both software and non-
software applications were correctly issued over 95 percent of the time each of the 
last six years. Final rejections across both software and non-software applications in 
2012 were correctly issued about 96 percent of the time, increasing meaningfully 
from 90 percent six years prior. Figure 3 shows that cumulatively, over the same 
Figure 3
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six years, allowances for software applications were correctly issued in 96.8 percent 
of cases and for non-software applications in 96.5 percent of the cases, Similarly, 
fi nal rejections for software applications were correctly issued in 93.6 percent of the 
cases and for non-software applications in 93.5 percent of the cases. These differ-
ences in allowance and fi nal rejection are not statistically signifi cant, showing that 
software applications are being examined in the same manner as applications in all 
other technologies, and upon independent review, examiners are found to have 
correctly followed all laws and regulations in a very high percentage of the cases.
We next consider the review by the Patent Offi ce board of patent appeals 
of examiner rejections during fi scal years 2003 –2012, as shown in Figure 4. 
Data from the later years, 2008 –2012, show that the board of patent appeals 
affi rms (in whole or in part) our examiners’ rejections of software applications 
in 57.0 percent of cases, about 2.2 percentage points higher than the rate of 
affi rmance for denial decisions across other technologies. This share shows a 
narrowing of the difference between software and non-software compared with 
2003 –2007, when the board of patent appeals affi rmed non-software rejections 
notably more often than software rejections, with statistically signifi cant annual 
differences at the 95 percent confi dence interval. In 2008, the affi rmance rate 
for software application appeals was essentially the same as with the overall rate, 
and has since declined more slowly than the affi rmance rate among non-software 
Figure 4
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application appeals. The affi rmance rate among software appeals is currently 
8.2 percentage points higher than that of other technologies, signifi cant at the 
95 percent confi dence interval.
As yet another institutional check on the work being completed at the Patent 
Offi ce, Congress has mandated that the decisions of the board of patent appeals 
can be submitted for review by the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 
We also examined these federal-court appeals, and while there are relatively 
few instances in which the US Court of Appeals has substantively evaluated the 
rejection of software applications, that court has upheld such rejections in over 
95 percent of the cases during 2003 –2012. Cumulatively, the decisions of the 
US Court of Appeals on cases appealed from the Patent Offi ce board of patent 
appeals have not meaningfully differed as regards the review of software and 
non-software applications.
These data demonstrate that it is not fair to conclude the Patent Offi ce is 
“soft” on software patent applications. In fact, our investigation of rejection rates 
shows that Patent Offi ce software application rejections are proper, as judged by 
comparison to other technology areas as well as when reviewed by our board of 
patent appeals. Moreover, the work of Patent Offi ce examiners is being upheld by a 
wide margin in the US federal courts that review their decision making.
Our analysis thus does not provide support for the statements many have made 
concerning the origin of the smart phone patent wars and the work of the Patent 
Offi ce. But that is not to say that the US Patent and Trademark Offi ce believes 
all is perfect in the world of software patents. There are things the Patent Offi ce 
should address, and is addressing, principally through the implementation of the 
America Invents Act of 2011, the most sweeping patent reform legislation in at least 
a generation.
 The America Invents Act as an Intervention
The America Invents Act of 2011 was the outcome of major compromise, and 
thus a source of both satisfaction and disappointment to all parties. Taken as a 
whole, the act in both substance and implementation addresses a host of issues 
raised by software patent critics. Among the provisions especially applicable to soft-
ware inventions are the new laws enabling individuals and fi rms to challenge the 
validity of issued patents. These “post-grant” challenge options include: post-grant 
review, inter partes (or third party) review, and “covered business method” patents 
review. These challenge procedures are handled by a panel of administrative judges, 
each of whom is highly skilled in both technology and patent-law issues. Moreover, 
all three options are statutorily mandated to be completed in one year, thereby 
offering substantial cost savings over litigation and ensuring resolution of validity 
disputes far faster than possible in the federal courts. This speedy resolution of 
controversies is particularly relevant to the software industry where product life 
cycles are often measured in months, not years. Furthermore, the Patent Offi ce 
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regulations implementing all three options are built on a common streamlined 
platform to promote simplicity, speed, and cost-effectiveness, all critical to software 
innovators of any size who may want to contest patents.
In the new process of post-grant opposition, patents can be challenged on 
all grounds, including eligibility and clarity. The new “covered business method” 
review procedure will also be useful in the software area, since it allows a party actu-
ally sued, or threatened with suit on any existing business method patent (no matter 
how recently issued), to challenge its validity. Also, in interpreting the meaning 
of “business methods” under the new statute, the Patent Offi ce has adopted an 
inclusive interpretation of that term to ensure that business methods implemented 
in software are eligible for review.
The inter partes, or third-party submission, allows any member of the public 
to participate by submitting documents and commentary for use by patent exam-
iners. Because deep knowledge is commonly housed in the electronic records of 
software experts outside the Patent Offi ce, this provision can help ensure patent 
examiners have access to the most relevant documents when examining software 
patent applications. Again, the Patent Offi ce has implemented the third-party 
submission provision in a simple, streamlined, and open fashion, providing an 
Internet-enabled path for third parties to make submissions at no cost for the fi rst 
three or fewer documents.
In these and other ways, the America Invents Act seeks to address many of the 
principal concerns surrounding software patent quality, approaching them in new 
and powerful ways. While the law continues to take effect, the Patent Offi ce has 
been using the fl exibility it has within its operational and regulatory scope to grant 
only valid software-related patents.
The Patent Offi ce: Responsibilities and Responses
Among the core drivers of software patent quality, there are perhaps two over-
arching considerations: 1) the correspondence between the scope of the patent 
disclosure—the explanation of what was invented and how it works; and 2) the 
scope of the patent claims—the boundaries of the legal protection provided to 
the patentee. For the patent bargain to work, to incentivize rather than to inhibit 
innovation, legal protection must be commensurate with scope of disclosure. 
Otherwise, an inventor who describes only one way to solve a problem may obtain 
patent coverage for many ways, or all ways, to solve the problem. Worse yet, a patent 
that describes no clear problem and solution does society no good at all. Those 
who work at the Patent Offi ce struggle every day to get this correspondence right, 
and see it as a primary responsibility.
While the disclosure-claim balance must be struck across all inventions in all 
fi elds, it has proven particularly diffi cult in the software area, where terminology has 
tended to shift and can be imprecise, and where functional language is frequently 
used to describe ideas that themselves are inherently functional in nature (leading 
82     Journal of Economic Perspectives
to a kind of “generalization on generalization” phenomenon). Moreover, during 
the 1990s while software patent fi lings were escalating, the courts as well as the 
Patent Offi ce were primarily focused on other parts of the patentability equation, 
and less on the tight correspondence between disclosure and claims.
More recently, participants in the patent system have paid renewed atten-
tion to disclosure–claim correspondence. Courts have issued a series of decisions 
strengthening requirements, and the Patent Offi ce has increased the time allotted 
to examiners for each patent application review while providing them with the 
training and tools to place more focus on disclosure requirements. In a further 
move, the Patent Offi ce issued specifi c internal guidelines focusing examiners on 
disclosure clarity and claim–disclosure correspondence. Patent Offi ce review of 
examiner actions shows an increase in the incidence of examiners raising clarity 
and claim–disclosure correspondence issues. More training, measurement, and 
refi nement is underway to ensure continued improvement.
Along with the disclosure–claim correspondence, another vital component in 
ensuring that only appropriate software patents are issued is the strong applica-
tion by examiners of the legal doctrine of “obviousness.” Obviousness governs the 
circumstances under which a patent applicant’s claim, judged against the body of 
relevant prior art documents predating a patent application, is merely obvious or an 
advance that merits patent protection. Here again, key court decisions during the 
last several years have signifi cantly changed the law in a direction enabling tighter 
examination practices by the Patent Offi ce. The seminal case was the Supreme 
Court’s decision in KSR Int’l Co. v. Telefl ex, Inc. (550 US 398 [2007]) in which the 
Court rejected a narrow, rigid conception of obviousness, and instead set forth a 
broader set of inquiries to fi nd whether patent claims should be treated as obvious.
The KSR decision, along with subsequent cases in the courts, have enabled 
patent examiners to consider software-related claims more carefully, taking 
advantage of the analogous nature of so much software and the ability of skilled 
programmers to draw from separate algorithms in creating new solutions. And the 
Patent Offi ce has taken advantage of the heightened standard by developing appro-
priate examination guidelines, educating examiners to use them, and ensuring 
usage. The goal is to produce more technical prior art available for examiners to 
apply, more appropriate ways to apply it, and ultimately the granting of software 
patents that more accurately refl ect substantial innovation.
 A Systemic Approach to Patent System Health
With these changes duly noted, there remains concern about an overhang of 
patents that were issued in the past. While some of the provisions of the America 
Invents Act—such as expanded post-grant review—may help, policy advocates have 
made other legislative and judicial proposals. Some have called upon Congress to 
expand the new “covered business method review” to include software, thereby 
giving competitors the opportunity to use evidence that has come to light in recent 
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years to challenge existing patents in a quick and cheap administrative hearing. 
Others are proposing the SHIELD Act that would adopt an English rule of cost-
shifting in litigation, thus putting the cost burden of defending a suit on the loser 
and creating disincentives to enforce low-quality patents. Similarly, courts continue 
to be asked to act on issues such as enhanced scrutiny of patent claims and experi-
mentation safe harbors, among others.
While the Patent Offi ce has not taken an offi cial position on these recom-
mendations, these ongoing disputes do refl ect a reality that the patent system is 
just that—a system. Different institutions work together to produce it. The Patent 
Offi ce, constrained by available resources and laws, cannot solve all possible prob-
lems. Importantly, the Patent Offi ce is often forced by circumstances to operate in 
areas of legal and technological uncertainty, like making decisions on the patent-
ability of embryonic technologies at a point when prior art is not well developed. 
It routinely takes many years before the courts begin to settle legal questions, and 
before scientifi c progress resolves uncertainty about technological relationships. 
As history has shown, the Patent Offi ce is routinely called upon to act before all 
possible bases of uncertainty are resolved.
To those who speculate on the costs of moving quickly in the face of uncertainty, 
economics teaches us to consider the counterfactual—we cannot know what growth 
and innovation would have looked like in the face of a “wait and see” approach. In 
this context, the biotechnology industry offers a notable example. The US moved 
quickly to make artifi cial life forms patent-eligible in the Diamond v. Chakrabarty 
decision (404 US 303 [1980]), signaling that research in emerging fi elds ranging 
from recombinant genetics to bioinformatics would be a sound investment.  Other 
industrialized nations have spent decades trying to catch up to the growth and value 
that the United States created in this sector.
Conclusion
Such results refl ect the ongoing balance sought by the US patent system, a 
balance most recently struck with the innovative reforms of the America Invents 
Act and the operational improvements of the Patent Offi ce to provide more robust 
and transparent examination. And as the data in this article show, the recent track 
record at the Patent Offi ce of examining patents containing software-related claims 
is an important counterweight to suggestions that the balance being struck is not 
appropriate. Accordingly, the smart phone patent wars, like other large-scale patent 
disputes in the past, may not refl ect a patent system that is broken, but rather a 
patent system that has helped to cultivate a groundbreaking body of advances in 
communications technology, advances that have invited market entry by competi-
tors. Still, just as patents are a meaningful incentive to innovate, so also is the 
enforcement of patents a reasonable exercise in appropriating value from innova-
tion. That reality is at the heart of how the constitutional and legislative system of 
patent rights is intended to operate.
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The history of the US patent system refl ects a cycle of disruption—occasioned 
by discontinuous technological change and market adaptation in its wake—and the 
ensuing search for a new institutional balance. The new balance has sometimes 
arisen from market solutions such as cross-licensure in patent pools, or legislative 
solutions such as patent term reform and pre-grant publication, or judicial solutions 
such as revised doctrines of nonobviousness and adequate disclosure. The store 
of knowledge has grown, whether in textiles with the sewing machine, or in high 
technology with the laser, or in biotechnology with engineered bacteria. Consumers 
have received not merely the now-inexpensive innovations of the past, but also a 
reliable promise of innovation for the future. To be sure, such a commitment to 
the long-term benefi ts of innovation is a struggle against demands for access in the 
short term, but it is one that eventually pays for itself.
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